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Abstract
The Minority Game (MG) behaves as a stochastically perturbed de-
terministic system due to the coin-toss invoked to resolve tied strategies.
Averaging over this stochasticity yields a description of the MG’s deter-
ministic dynamics via mapping equations for the strategy score and global
information. The strategy-score map contains both restoring-force and
bias terms, whose magnitudes depend on the game’s quenched disorder.
Approximate analytical expressions are obtained and the effect of ‘market
impact’ discussed. The global-information map represents a trajectory on
a De Bruijn graph. For small quenched disorder, an Eulerian trail rep-
resents a stable attractor. It is shown analytically how anti-persistence
arises. The response to perturbations and different initial conditions are
also discussed.
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1 Introduction
The Minority Game (MG) introduced by Challet and Zhang [1] offers possibly
the simplest paradigm for a complex, dynamical system comprising many com-
peting agents. Models based on the Minority Game concept have a broad range
of potential applications, for example financial markets, biological systems,
crowding phenomena and routing problems [2]. There have been many studies
of the statistical properties of the MG [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
which treat the game as a quasi-stochastic system.
In this paper we examine the MG from a different perspective by treating it
as a primarily deterministic system and then exploring the rich dynamics which
result. Our desire to look at microscopic dynamical properties, as opposed to
global statistics, is motivated by the fact that the physical systems we are inter-
ested in modeling are only realized once (e.g. the time-evolution of a financial
market). Only limited insight is therefore available from taking configuration
averages in such cases. In addition it is of great interest to examine transient
effects such as the response of the system to perturbations, and the mechanisms
which determine the game’s trajectories in time. We find that we are able to
provide a description of the resulting deterministic dynamics via mapping equa-
tions, and can hence investigate these important effects. The outline of the
paper is as follows: after briefly discussing the MG in the remainder of this
section, Sec. 2 examines the MG as a functional map. Section 3 focuses on the
effect of the underlying (‘quenched’) disorder arising from unequal population
of the strategy-space. Section 4 discusses the dynamics of the game on a de
Bruijn graph. Section 5 provides the conclusions.
The most basic formulation of a MG comprises an odd number of agents N
who at each turn of the game choose between two options ‘0’ and ‘1’ [1, 2]. These
options could be used to represent buy/sell, choose road A/road B etc. The aim
of the agents is common: to choose the least-subscribed option, the ‘minority’
group. At the end of each turn of the game, the winning decision corresponds
to the minority group and is announced to all the agents. The agents have a
memory of m bits, hence they can recall the last m winning decisions. The
global information µ available to each and every agent is therefore a binary
word m bits long, hence µ belongs to the set {0, 1, ...P − 1} where P = 2m. In
order to make a decision about which option to choose, each agent is allotted s
strategies at the outset of the game, which cannot be altered during the game.
Each strategy R maps every possible value of µ to a prediction aµR ∈ {−1, 1}
where −1 ⇒ (option 0) and 1 ⇒ (option 1). There are 22
m
different possible
binary strategies. However, many of the strategies in this space are similar to
one another, i.e. they are separated by a small Hamming distance. It has been
shown [3] that the principle features of the MG are reproduced in a smaller
Reduced Strategy Space (RSS) of 2m+1 strategies, in which any two strategies
are separated by a Hamming distance of 2m or 2m−1, i.e. the two strategies are
anti-correlated or un-correlated respectively.
The agents follow the prediction of their historically best-performing strat-
egy. They measure this performance by rewarding strategies with the correct
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mapping of global information to winning decision, and penalizing those with an
incorrect mapping. Strategies are scored in this manner irrespective of whether
they are played. As each agent will reward and penalize the same strategy in the
same way, there is a common set of strategy scores which are collected together
to form the strategy score vector S. The common perception of a strategy’s
success or failure will lead to agents deciding to use or avoid the same strategy
in groups - this leads to crowd behavior as analyzed in Refs. [4, 5].
2 MG as a functional map
The Minority Game is often introduced heuristically as a set of rules determining
the update of the agents’ strategies and the global information. It can however
easily be cast into a functional map which reproduces the game when iterated.
Moreover, this functional map can be iterated without having to keep track of
the labels for individual agents. We achieve this by introducing a formalism
which groups together agents who hold the same combination of strategies,
and hence respond in an identical way to all values of the global information set
µ = {0, 1...P−1}. This grouping is achieved via the tensor Ω which is initialized
at the outset of the game and quantifies the particular quenched disorder for that
game [4]. Ω is s-dimensional with rows/columns of length 2P (in the RSS) such
that entry ΩR1,R2,... is the number of agents holding strategies {R1, R2, ...}. The
entries of Ω (and also of the strategy score vector S) are ordered by increasing
decimal equivalent. For example, strategies from the RSS for m = 2 are ordered
{0000, 0011, 0101, 0110, ...}, therefore strategy R is anti-correlated to strategy
2P + 1−R. Ω is randomly filled with uniform probability such that
∑
R,R′,...
Ω
R,R′,...
= N
It is useful to construct a configuration of this tensor, Ψ, which is symmetric
in the sense that Ψ{R1,R2,...} = Ψp{R1,R2,...} where p{R1, R2, ...} is any permu-
tation of strategies R1, R2, ... . For s = 2 we let Ψ= 12
(
Ω+ ΩT
)
[15]. Now we
proceed to a formula for the attendance A of the MG (i.e. the sum of all the
agents’ predictions and hence actions):
A = aµ · n =
2P∑
R=1
aµRnR (1)
where aµR is the response of strategy R to global information µ and nR is the
number of agents playing strategy R. We can define nR in terms of the strategy
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score vector S and Ψ and hence rewrite Eq. 1 to give the following for s = 2:
A [S, µ] =
2P∑
R=1
aµR
2P∑
R′=1
(1 + sgn [SR − SR′ ])ΨR,R′ (2)
+
2P∑
R 6=R′
aµRδSR,SR′
(
bin
[
2Ψ
R,R′
,
1
2
]
−Ψ
R,R′
)
where bin [n, p] is a sample from a binomial distribution of n trials with probabil-
ity of success p. Here the constraint bin
[
2Ψ
R,R′
, 12
]
+bin
[
2Ψ
R′,R
, 12
]
= 2Ψ
R,R′
applies in order to conserve agent number. The second term of this attendance
equation (Eq. 2) introduces a stochastic element in the game; it corresponds
to the situation where agents may have several top-scoring strategies and must
thereby toss a coin to decide which to use. We note that Eq. 2 could be re-
written replacing the sgn function with a tanh. The effect of this would be
to make the number of agents playing strategy R1 (as opposed to their other
strategy R2) vary smoothly as a function of the separation in score of the two
strategies, rather than simply playing the best. This modification is similar in
concept to that of the Thermal Minority Game (TMG) [7, 8] wherein agents
play their best strategy with a certain probability depending on its score. The
difference here would be that, in contrast to the TMG, the system would still be
entirely deterministic hence lending itself readily to similar analysis as presented
here.
With this formalism, the game can be described concisely by the following
coupled mapping equations:
S [t] = S [t− 1]− aµ[t−1]χ [A [S [t− 1] , µ [t− 1]]] (3)
µ [t] = 2µ [t− 1]− P H
[
µ [t− 1]−
P
2
]
+H [−A [S [t− 1] , µ [t− 1]]] (4)
where H [x] is the Heaviside function and χ [A] is a monotonic, increasing func-
tion of the game attendance quantifying the particular choice of reward structure
(i.e. payoff). In most of the MG literature χ [A] = sgn [A] or χ [A] = A [6].
Although the macroscopic statistical properties of the MG are largely unaltered
by the choice of χ, we later demonstrate that the microscopic dynamics can be
affected markedly.
This formulation shows that the MG obeys a one-step, stochastically per-
turbed deterministic mapping between states {S [t] , µ [t]} and {S [t+ 1] , µ [t+ 1]}.
It is interesting to ask the following question: ‘How important is the stochastic
term of Eq. 2 to the resultant dynamics?’. Table 1 shows the frequency with
which the outcome (sgn [−A]) is changed by the stochastic perturbation to the
mapping. We can see that the stochastic term has a small but non-negligible
effect on the game. For the strategy reward system χ = sgn, the number of
instances of coin-tossing agents affecting the outcome is greater than with the
proportional reward system of χ = 1. This is easily understood in terms of the
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homogeneity of the score-vector S; the χ = sgn scoring system is much more
likely to generate tied strategies than the χ = 1 system which also incorporates
the dynamics of the attendance A. Therefore, in the χ = sgn scoring system
there will be a much higher proportion of coin-tossing agents and thus a greater
effect on the game.
The general effect of the stochastic contribution to the MG is to break the
pattern of behavior emergent from the deterministic part of the map. It is
therefore of great interest to examine further what the dynamics of this deter-
ministic behavior are. To do this we replace the stochastic term of Eq. 2 by its
mean. The equation thus becomes (AD [S, µ] in Ref. [12]):
A [S, µ] =
2P∑
R=1
aµR
2P∑
R′=1
(1 + sgn [SR − SR′ ]) ΨR,R′ (5)
Physically this replacement is an averaging process; when SR1 = SR2 we have
half the agents who hold {R1, R2} playing R1 and the other half playing R2 [16].
Equations 3,4 & 5 now define a deterministic map which replicates the behavior
of the MG between perturbative events caused by the coin-tossing agents - we
refer to this system as the ‘Deterministic Minority Game’ (DMG). We will now
use this system to investigate the emergence of microscopic and macroscopic
dynamics.
3 Disorder in Ψ
The game is conditioned at the start with the initial state {S [0] , µ [0]}. It
is also given a Ψ tensor for a particular parameter set N,m, s. The game’s
future behavior will be inherited from Ψ; games with sparsely and densely filled
tensors hence behave in entirely different ways. By assuming each entry of Ω
is an independent binomial sample Ω
R1,R2
= bin
[
N, 1(2P )s
]
we may categorize
the disorder in the Ω tensor by the standard deviation of an element divided by
its mean size. For s = 2, this gives
σ
[
Ω
R1,R2
]
µ
[
Ω
R1,R2
] =
√
(2P )
2
− 1
N
which rapidly becomes large as m increases. For lowm and high N , the game is
said to be in an ‘efficient phase’ [2] where all states of the global information set
µ are visited equally and hence, on average, there is no drift in the strategies’
scores i.e. 〈SR〉t = 0. In this regime, the disorder in the Ω tensor is small and
thus all elements are approximately of equal magnitude. This in turn implies
that the dynamics of the game are dominated by the movement of S rather than
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by the asymmetry of Ω. The attendance of the (s = 2) game here reduces to
A [S, µ] ≈
N
4P 2
2P∑
R=1
aµR
2P∑
R′=1
sgn [SR − SR′ ] (6)
The second sum in Eq. 6 corresponds to a quantity qR which is based on the
rank of strategy R; specifically qR = 2P + 1 − 2ρR where ρR is the rank of
strategy R, with ρR = 1 being the highest scoring and ρR = 2P being the
lowest scoring. Hence Eq. 6 becomes
A [S, µ] ≈
N
4P 2
aµ · q . (7)
We now examine the increment in strategy score, δS[t] = S [t] − S [t− 1] . For
simplicity, we here assume the proportional scoring system of χ = 1. Hence
δS = −aµA [S, µ] ≈ −
N
4P 2
aµ
(
aµ · q
)
.
If we average over uniformly occurring states of µ, we then have for each strategy
〈δSR〉µ ≈ −
N
4P 2
2P∑
R′=1
〈aµRa
µ
R′〉µ qR′
We now use the orthogonality of strategies in the RSS: 1
P
∑
µ a
µ
R1a
µ
R2 = {0 for
R1 6= R2, 1 for R1 = R2,−1 for R2 = R1} . This yields
〈δSR〉µ ≈
N
2P 2
(ρR − ρR) (8)
where R = 2P + 1 − R is the anti-correlated strategy to R. Equation 8 now
shows us explicitly that strategies and their anti-correlated partners attract each
other in pairs. The magnitude of the score increment is also of interest; for low
m and high N the attractive force is large, which will cause the strategies to
overshoot each other and thus perform a constant cycle of swapping positions.
As we increase m or decrease N the attractive force becomes weaker and so
the score cycling adopts a longer time-period; it eventually becomes too weak
to overcome the separate force arising from the asymmetry in Ψ. Hence the
system moves away from the strongly mean-reverting behavior in S.
We can investigate this change of regime further by examining 〈δSR〉µ for
finite disorder in Ψ [17]. Again using the orthogonality of strategies in the RSS,
we have
〈δSR〉µ = δS
bias
R + δS
restoring
R = (9)
−
2P∑
R′=1
(
Ψ
R,R′
−Ψ
R,R′
)
(10)
−
2P∑
R′=1
(
sgn [SR − SR′ ] ΨR,R′ + sgn [SR + SR′ ] ΨR,R′
)
.
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Equation 9 has two distinct contributions. The first term δSbiasR arises from
disorder in Ψ alone and is time-independent, representing a constant bias on
the score increment. The second term δSrestoringR acts as a mean-reverting
force on the strategy score; its magnitude depends on how many strategies lie
between it and its anti-correlated partner (just as in Eq. 8). Figure 1 illustrates
this for a case where SR > 0; here the net contribution to δS
restoring
R is likely
to be negative as there are more contributing elements with a negative sign
than with a positive sign. The strategies R′ ∋ − |SR| < SR′ < |SR| always
contribute terms − sgn [SR]
(
ΨR,R′ +ΨR,R′
)
to δSrestoringR and so will always
act as a mean-reverting component. Terms from strategies outside this range
will always be divided into equally sized positive and negative groups as shown
in Fig. 1. These groups will on average cancel out each other’s effect on the
score increment.
We can model the average magnitude of each term in Eq. 9 by using the same
binomial representation for the elements of Ω as before. The mean magnitude
of the bias and restoring force terms
〈∣∣δSbiasR ∣∣〉R and
〈〈∣∣∣δSrestoringR ∣∣∣〉
SR
〉
R
are
thus approximately given as follows:
〈∣∣δSbiasR ∣∣〉R ≈
√√√√ N
Ppi
(
1−
1
(2P )
2
)
(11)
〈〈∣∣∣δSrestoringR ∣∣∣〉
SR
〉
R
≈
Nγ
4P 2
.
The term γ enumerates the average net number of terms in δSrestoringR that
act to mean revert SR i.e. the excess number of terms with sign − sgn [SR].
Averaged over the entire set of strategies, we have γ = 2P . Figure 2 shows
that our approximate form for the average strategy score bias in Eq. 11 is
extremely good over the entire range of α = P/N whereas the approximation
of the restoring force term becomes progressively worse as α is increased. This
effect can be explained in terms of the ‘market impact’ of a strategy. The greater
the number of agents using a strategy nR, the greater its contribution is to the
attendance as can be seen from Eq. 1. As nR is increased above nR′ 6=R, the
greater the probability becomes of the game outcome (− sgn [A]) being opposed
to aµR and hence strategy R being penalized. This effect will arise if the quenched
disorder in Ψ is such that more agents hold strategy R than R′ 6= R. As α is
raised and the quenched disorder in Ψ grows, this effect will become increasingly
important. Hence it can be seen that Ψ
R,R′
and {SR, SR′} are not independent
as assumed in obtaining Eq. 11, but are instead correlated through the effect
of market impact; this correlation becomes more significant as α is increased.
The nature of the correlation between Ψ
R,R′
and {SR, SR′} introduced by
market impact is non-trivial in form as can be seen from Fig. 3. We will not dis-
cuss the details of an analytic reconstruction of Ψ
ρ,ρ′
here, but will instead sim-
ply note some straightforward constraints on its form. Let us take the approxi-
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mation that on average the ranking of the strategies {ρR} is given by the ranking
of their bias terms {δSbiasR }. This will be true on average for a system described
by Eq. 9. We then use the approximation that δSbiasR ∽ N
[
0,
√
N
2P
(
1− 14P 2
)]
.
Ordering the bias terms resulting from samples drawn from this distribution,
gives us that Ψ
ρ,ρ′
satisfies
Erf

 〈δSbiasρ 〉√
N
P
(
1− 14P 2
)

 = P − ρ
P
with δSbiasρ given by −
∑2P
ρ′=1
(
Ψ
ρ,ρ′
−Ψ
ρ,ρ′
)
as in Eq. 9. This relation gives us
an indication of how the rank of a strategy is affected by its excess population,
and is consistent with the form of Ψ
ρ,ρ′
as shown in Fig. 3. Note that in the
absence of market impact we would not be able to write down any equation
linking these parameters and Fig. 3 would be flat with no structure.
We have thus shown how market impact is profoundly manifest within the
structure of the MG [1]. In particular, Fig. 2 shows clearly that considera-
tion of market impact is necessary in the calculation of the transition point
from efficient to inefficient regimes [1]. The game enters the inefficient regime
if the magnitude of the bias term to the score increment (arising from disor-
der in Ψ) exceeds the magnitude of the restoring force term. We can calculate
when on average strategies begin to drift by looking at when
〈∣∣δSbiasR ∣∣〉R =〈〈∣∣∣δSrestoringR ∣∣∣〉
SR
〉
R
in Eq. 11. This occurs near α = αc ≈
pi
4 . This over-
estimation of the transition point (which numerically occurs in the DMG at
around αc = 0.39) could be corrected by taking into account the non-flat struc-
ture of Ψ
ρ,ρ′
. We would like to stress here that only on average does there
exist a specific point at which the game passes from mean-reverting to biased
behavior (efficient to inefficient regime). Because the behavior of the game is
dictated by the disorder in Ω and not just by the specific parameters N,m, s
alone, a knowledge of α is not enough information to classify the game as being
in either the efficient or inefficient regime. Therefore it seems arguable as to
whether αc is a ‘critical’ value for any particular realization of this system.
Equation 9 can also yield insight into the dynamics in the regime past the
transition point. We were able to predict from Eq. 8 that in the efficient
regime, pairs of anti-correlated strategies would cycle around each other thus
producing an ever changing score rank vector ρ. In the inefficient regime wherein
the strategy scores have appreciable bias, it would be natural to assume that ρ
would rapidly find a steady state as the strategy scores diverged. This in fact
does not happen; for example, consider the outermost pair of strategies in the
score-space (i.e. the current best, and its anti-correlated partner the worst) at
a point in the game. For these strategies, Eq. 9 is given approximately by
〈δSR〉µ ≈ −
2P∑
R′=1
(
Ψ
R,R′
−Ψ
R,R′
)
− sgn [SR]
2P∑
R′=1
(
Ψ
R,R′
+Ψ
R,R′
)
.
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Irrespective of the disorder in Ψ, we have
∣∣δSbias∣∣ . ∣∣δSrestoring∣∣. It is thus
likely that this strategy pair attract each other until at least one other pair take
their place as best/worst. This behavior will lead to a non-stationary ρ-vector,
even in this regime.
The present analysis has described general properties of the game such as the
transition in behavior between efficient and inefficient regimes. It has also shown
that dynamical processes such as the changing nature of ρ can be quantitatively
explained purely in terms of the quenched disorder in the strategy population
tensor Ω.
4 Dynamics in µ-space
The previous section was concerned with the behavior of the strategy score
vector S, and often treated the dynamical variable µ as a random process to
be averaged over. This however glosses over the subtle and very interesting
dynamics of µ itself as dictated by Eq. 4. (References [9] and [12] also consider
aspects of µ dynamics). To aid in our discussion, we note that Eq. 4 describes a
trajectory along the edges of a directed de Bruijn graph D2 [m]. Fig. 4 shows an
example of such a graph for m = 2. As explained in the previous section, in the
efficient regime S is strongly mean reverting. This implies that the set of states
of the game {S, µ} is finite. As the system is Markovian and deterministic, this
in turn implies that it must exhibit periodic behavior in this regime as return
to a past state would then be followed by the revisiting of the trajectory from
that state. In the inefficient regime where the strategy scores are biased, the
set of states {S, µ} is unbounded and we may expect aperiodic behavior of the
DMG.
We now examine the structure of the periodic behavior in the efficient regime.
One observation from numerical simulations is that the period i.e. return time
to any state {S, µ} is observed over many runs to be T = 2P for the χ = sgn
scoring system whereas for the χ = 1 system the period is much longer and run-
dependent. This periodic behavior seems able to exist up to the point where
the occurrence of zero attendance A [S, µ] = 0 causes stochastic perturbation
to µ [16]; after this point we can no longer treat our system as deterministic.
Such periodic behavior must satisfy the conditions
{
∆Scycle = 0,∆µcycle = 0
}
.
T = 2P is in fact the shortest possible period which satisfies these conditions.
The two edges leading away from any vertex µ on the de Bruijn graph must
necessarily inccur score increments of opposite sign: +aµ |χ [A]| ,−aµ |χ [A]| cor-
responding to positive and negative attendance respectively. The vectors aµ1
and aµ26=µ1 are orthogonal; hence the only way that an increment to the score
of aµ[t]χ [A [S [t] , µ [t]]] can be negated in order to achieve ∆Scycle = 0, is to
return to that vertex (i.e. µ [t′] = µ [t]) a particular number of times such that∑
{t′}
χ [A [S [t′] , µ [t]]] = 0 (12)
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This condition must be satisfied at all vertices of the graph because the set {t′}
which satisfies Eq. 12 must have a minimum of two entries (each of opposite
attendance) thereby leading the game to different, new vertices until all are
spanned.
Consider the χ = sgn scoring system. The condition corresponding to Eq.
12 is easily satisfied at each vertex with a set {t′} of exactly 2λ entries, λ being
an integer. We now have the situation where all edges of the graph are visited
equally. The shortest way of doing this is with λ = 1; this cycle is known as an
‘Eulerian trail’. This dynamical stable state of the game acts as an attractor;
the MG in the efficient phase will rapidly find this state after undergoing a
stochastic perturbation. We note that the Time-Horizon Minority Game [12]
exhibits similar behavior for special values of the time horizon τ . This trajectory
of the DMG along a Eulerian trail corresponds to the occurrence of perfect anti-
persistence in the [A|µ] time series. This anti-persistence has been empirically
observed in many studies of the MG [1, 6, 14].
Now consider the χ = 1 scoring system. The condition of Eq. 12 is very
much harder to achieve over all vertices as the dynamics of A are incorporated
back into the score vector S making the set {S, µ} very much larger. This
explains the very much longer period of this game which, even over very long
time windows, can appear aperiodic. The Eulerian trail will still however be an
attractor to the dynamics within µ-space, since the anti-persistence in [A|µ] is
still strong (in the efficient phase). It is not however perfect as was the case for
the DMG using the χ = sgn scoring system.
To quantitatively explain this anti-persistence, we make the following ap-
proximation:
sgn [A] ≈ sgn [a · S] . (13)
This approximation can be understood by referring back to Eq. 7 where S now
plays the same role as the rank-measure q. It is valid for the regime where the
strategy scores are densely spaced, i.e. for the efficient regime/low disorder in
Ψ. Consider the χ = sgn scoring system wherein the score vector is simply given
by S [t] = S [0]−
∑t−1
j=1 sgn [A [j]] a
µ[j]. We use the fact that the vectors aµ1 and
aµ26=µ1 are orthogonal to transform Eq. 13 to the following form:
sgn [A [t]] ≈ sgn

aµ · S [0]− 2P∑
{t′}
sgn [A [t′]]

 (14)
where we recall that the set of times {t′} are such that µ [t′] = µ [t] = µ for
0 < t′ < t. This dynamical process occurring over times t′ rather than t is zero-
reverting. Let us demonstrate this by taking an example. Let P = 4 and the ini-
tial strategy score be such that aµ ·S [0] = 20. The time-series of sgn [A [t]] thus
becomes as shown in Table 2. Hence the game cascades from its initial state, the
attendance at a given vertex of the de Bruijn graph ([A|µ]) exhibiting persistent
behavior until a point is reached such that
∣∣∣aµ · S [0]− 2P∑{t′} sgn [A [t′]]∣∣∣ <
10
2P . Subsequently the attendance [A|µ] becomes perfectly anti-persistent. When
this anti-persistence occurs at each vertex, the game has locked into one of the
22
m
/2m+1 Eulerian trails. The analysis above can be generalized for different
scoring systems (such as χ = 1) where in general it is found that the game
exhibits strong but not perfect anti-persistence in [A|µ] in this regime.
In the analysis above we introduced the effect of the initial condition on
the score vector S [0] (see also Ref. [13]). However, we could just as correctly
view S [0] as the current state, left by some other game process such as a shock
to the system, a build up from some other game mechanism or a stochastic
perturbation. It is therefore interesting to examine how the DMG evolves after
a given state {S [0] , µ [0]} is imposed. The ‘initial’ condition S [0] must obey
the form SR = −SR; this is to ensure that a priori no strategies are given a
bias. It would be unphysical to break this rule; strategy R always loses the
same number of points as its anti-correlated partner R gains in any reasonable
physical mechanism. We expect that if the elements SR [0] have magnitude less
than 2P then the system will very quickly lock into the Eulerian trail trajectory
and visit all µ-states equally. However, if the elements |SR [0]| ≫ 2P then Eq.
14 predicts that there will be persistence in [A|µ] until the dynamical stable
state is found. This persistence in trajectory at each node of the de Bruijn
graph will lead to the game visiting only a small subset of the vertices on the
graph unlike in the stable-state situation. This reduced cycling effect may lead
to a bias in the attendance over a significant period of time, i.e. a ‘crash’ or
‘rally’.
We now demonstrate the recovery of the DMG from a randomly chosen ini-
tial score vector S [0]. We take a system with low disorder in Ψ and m = 2
(such that 2P = 8). However we draw SR [0] from a much wider uniform dis-
tribution, spanning −100...100. (Note we maintain SR = −SR as required).
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the game out of this state. The initial con-
dition is soon ‘worked out’ of the system - it rapidly finds the Eulerian cycle
µ = 0, 0, 1, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, .. after only 174 turns. As can also be seen, the game
adopts several different types of cycle on its way towards this stable state. The
switch between cycle types occurs as each vertex snaps from persistent to anti-
persistent behavior.
We have hence discussed and explained the dynamics of the stable state,
and how the system enters that state from an initial or perturbed state. This
analysis has been for the system in the efficient phase where the quenched
disorder of Ψ is low. The inefficient regime will in general show a different
set of dynamics. As discussed earlier, the inefficient phase is characterized by
score vectors which have an appreciable drift; this is an effect of the disorder
in Ψ. The corresponding unbounded S [t] vector leads to an unbounded set of
states for the system {S, µ}. This suggests that the overall dynamics may be
aperiodic, i.e. the system never returns to a past state. We can however say
something about the nature of the resulting dynamics in µ-space. As the score
vector diverges the score rank vector ρ becomes more well defined (although
not completely stationary in time, as mentioned in Sec. 3). This is tantamount
to there being a certain degree of persistence in the attendance at a vertex
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[A|µ]. This will lead to the motion around the de Bruijn graph being limited
to a certain sub-space, just as that described above for the recovery from an
initial score vector S [0]. This difference in the dynamics for the efficient and
inefficient regimes leads to the well-documented result that the occurrence of
different m+ 1 bit words is even in the efficient regime but very uneven in the
inefficient regime [6].
5 Conclusion
The results in this paper confirm that the MG can be usefully viewed as a
stochastically perturbed deterministic system, and that this deterministic sys-
tem can be described concisely by coupled mapping equations (Eqs. 3, 4 and
5). We used this system to explore the dynamics of the score vector S [t]. We
showed that the score increment comprises a bias and restoring-force term, the
comparative magnitude of these terms being governed by the disorder in the
strategy population tensor Ω. Furthermore, we were able to obtain analytic
approximations for the bias and restoring force terms. We showed how the
market-impact effect correlated the strategy population to the score vector and
how this then affected our approximations.
We also discussed the dynamics of the global information µ [t] as a trajectory
on a de Bruijn graph. We were able to show that in the efficient regime the sys-
tem would be periodic and that the favored periodic trajectory was that of an
Eulerian Trail. Analytically we were able to demonstrate how anti-persistence
and persistence arise in the attendance at a vertex [A|µ], and how this would
manifest itself in efficient and inefficient regimes either in response to a per-
turbed state or an initial condition of S [0].
We are grateful to A. Short and P.M. Hui for useful discussions and com-
ments.
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TABLES
m χ = sgn χ = 1
2 7.2± 4.2 0.7± 0.6
3 6.3± 3.0 2.4± 0.8
4 9.4± 2.1 3.4± 0.8
TABLE 1. Percentage of time-steps in which the minority room is changed
by the stochastic decision of agents with tied strategies. Percentages are shown
for the digital and proportional payoffs. Statistics obtained from 16 numerical
runs of the MG with N = 101, s = 2, and over 1000 time-steps.
aµ · S [0]− 2P
∑
{t′} sgn [A [t
′]] sgn [A [t]]
20− 8× (0) = 20 1
20− 8× (0 + 1) = 12 1
20− 8× (0 + 1 + 1) = 4 1
20− 8× (0 + 1 + 1 + 1) = −4 −1
20− 8× (0 + 1 + 1 + 1− 1) = 4 1
20− 8× (0 + 1 + 1 + 1− 1 + 1) = −4 −1
TABLE 2. An example of how the game cascades from an initial state (c.f.
Eq. 14). Here P = 4 and aµ ·S [0] = 20. The attendance (right column) exhibits
persistent, and then anti-persistent, behavior.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the signs of contributing terms to
δSrestoring.
FIG. 2. Numerical and approximate analytical magnitude of average score
increment terms
〈∣∣δSbiasR ∣∣〉R and
〈〈∣∣∣δSrestoringR ∣∣∣〉
SR
〉
R
FIG. 3. Contour plot of
〈
Ψ
ρ,ρ′
〉
, i.e. an average of the strategy population
tensor re-ordered each turn with strategies running from highest to lowest score
(top to bottom and left to right). Black areas indicate low population and
white areas indicate high population. The averaging is carried out over 50 runs
(different Ω) and 1000 turns within each run. MG game parameters α = 0.32,
s = 2.
FIG. 4. De Bruijn graph D2 [2] corresponding tom = 2. Vertices are labelled
with the state µ, edges are labelled with the quantity δS/ |χ [A]|. The dotted
line shows one of the two possible Eulerian trails of this graph.
FIG. 5. An example of the convergence of the DMG onto the Eulerian trail
attractor. Top graph shows the dynamics in the global information µ [t]. Bottom
graph shows the dynamics in score SR [t] for 1 6 R 6 4 (out of 2P = 8). Game
locks into attractor at turn 174. Game parameters N = 101, m = 2, s = 2.
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